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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CA.SE

This is an appeal fran a trial de novo hearing in Third District Court
fran a finding of the Utah Department of Public Safety, Driver's License

Division Hearing that the Jlppellant unreasonably refused to subnit to
a chanical test W'lder Utah's inplied consent statute.
DISPOSITICN IN I.CMER OJURr

Judge Jay Banks of the Third District Court found that the
requirerre:nts of Utah' s inplied consent law had been met, and that the
Appellant had wrongfully refused a chsni.cal test pursuant thereto
and revoked Applant's Driver's License for one year.

RELEF SOUGHT CN APPEAL

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the inplied consent
law which purports to deny a right to COlmSel to the accused and challenges
the factual finding of the ju:lgment in lower court and seeks the reinstatement

of his driver's license.
FAC'I'S
On Q:tober 8, 1977, at approx:illlately 3:34 a.rn., a Salt lake City

Police Officer, Henry B. Huish, stopped the Appellant in an alley outside
of his apartment for a minor traffice violation (T-39,40,47).

At trial,

the officer (T-39) tesitified that over the next few minutes he detected
the odor of alcolx>l (T-43); that Appellant had numbled and slurred

5Peech (T-42,43); had hand coordination problems (T-43); and admitted
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to having had tw::> beers earlier (T-42).

After conlcirling that the

.Appellant was under the influence of alcohol, the officer placed the
.Appellant under arrest for exhibition driving
the influence of alcohol.
SClle

am

driving W'lder

He then asked the Appellant to take

field sobriety tests which were refused.

(T-43,66,67,71).

furing the period of tine after the officer pulled the Appellant
over,

am

prior to arresting him, the officer made the Appellant sit

in his car for fifteen minutes (T-47) to a half an hour (T-65).
Such treat:nent aroused the anger

of the Jl.E:pellant, and he told

the officer that he felt he was being treated unfarily, which angererl
the officer. (T-48,67,69,71,72,73).

Shortly after the arrest, Officer Huish requested the Appellant to
take a breathalyzer test (T-45).

The Jl.E:pellant requested an

o~unity

to consult counsel in order to determine whether or not it was in
his best interests to take a breath test or to refuse (T-51,T-67, T-68).
The officer refused to let

arrest

am

him call an attorney.

Between the

time of

the tine the officer marked the Appellant as a refusal,

about 45 to 50 minutes had elapsed (T-47).
attorney IS whereabout I hiS telephone number I

The Appellant was aware of his

am

could have CCJlPleterl

a call within ten minutes. He had left his attorney's tare just prior

to the arrest. (T-57 ,68,69).
After the arrest, the officer read to the .Appellant the MirarXla
rights which incltrled the right to cxmsult counsel.

At the jail, the

officer all~ the Appellant an opportunity to read a card oontaining
the implied consent law.

'!bat card did not infonn the Appellant that

he could not consult counsel.

(T-68)
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Herschel Bullen and Sandra M:::Intosh, character witnesses, stated
that the Appellant's reputation .in the camunity for truthfulness and
veracity are excellent. (T-59, 61).
I

SKTION 41-6-44.10 (g), urAH CXlDE ANNOm'IED (1953 as anended 1977)
DEPRIVES THE PIAINTIFF OF HIS CDNSTI1'mONALLY PIDI'ECTF.D RIGHT AGAINST
SELF INCRIMINATION AND HIS Ric:HT 'TO CXXJNSEL UNDER 'lHE CXN>TI'IUrIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF urAH, m:x:::AUSE 41-6-44.10 (h)
RAISES THE PRE-TRIAL CCNFKJNTATIOO 'TO A "CRITICAL STJ\GE" OF '!HE
Pro:EEDING.S.

§41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated, provides that it is illegal to drive
while under the .influence of .intoxicat.ing beverages and provides certain
presumptions which will be enterta.ined by the Court regarding blood 1evels
at the tirre of driv.ing.

In order to facilitate those presumptions, the

Legislature then provides for a rretlx:xi of obtaining evidence as to blood
alcoool levels.

Tl'Dse provisions are encarpassed in §41-6-44.10 which

provides the requirement to sul:mit to chanical testing of breath, blood
or urine to determine alcoh::>l content.

A refusal to sul:mit when rightfully

rff!Uested results in a suspension of driving privileges.

SUbsection '(g)

thereof states as follows:

For the purpose of determining whether to sul:mit
to a chanical test or tests, the person to be tested shall
not have the right to consult an attorney nor shall such a
perosn be pentlited to have an attorney, physician or other
person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
By that section, there is an attetpt

to

subvert the right to counsel as

guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of
the State of Utah.
In the case Of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the

United States Suprene Court held that the Sixth 1\merXJrrent guarantee of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assistance of counsel was applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
1\meOOment to the United State Constitution.
Supraie Court has exterrled that right.

Subsequently, the

In Unieed States v. Wade,

388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court held that an accused does not have to
stan1 alone against state prosecution at any stage of criminal prosecution,

formal or informal, in oa.irt or out of court, if the absence of counsel
might infringe upon his right to a fair trial.

The Cbnstitution of

the State of utah, Article I, Section 12, reads as follows:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to appear and deferrl in person and by counsel.
the accused shall not be canpe.lled to give evidence
ag~inst himself; . • .

Furthernore, in civil proceedings, the Utah State Constitution provides
in Article I, Section. l l as follows:
• • • No person shall be barred fran prosecuting
or defending before any tribmal in the state, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
--

The language of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), applying
the principles that were being developed at that time, apply equally

to civil cases such as ours.

That case exterrled the right to tlPse

pre-trial confrontations wherein the presence of counsel,
. . . is necessary to preserve the defeOOa.nt' s
right neaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against
him and to have effective assistance of counsel at
the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether
potential substantial prejudice to deferrlant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability
of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. " 388 U.S. at 277.
In other "WOrds, the ability to have a meaningful trial, civil or

criminal, may be circl.mtvented by pre-trial confrontation, wherein the
accused is required to provide evidence to be used against him at
trial.

By the use of evidence that has been obtained in the absence of

counsel, which with ccmpetent advice of counsel, 'WOUld not have been
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obtaina:l., the police have been too often able to get convictions where
none were deserved.

In

the case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1974),

the court illustrated the difficulty with the following language:
The rule sought by the state herein, :tvwever
would make the trial no ITOre than an appeal fran the
interrogations; and the right to use counsel at
trial [would be} a very rollow thing [if] , for all
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured
by pre-trial examination. • • •

The Escobedo rationale is particularly apt umer the current

state of §41-6-44.10.
the:State~am

Subsection (g) of that section exceeds the limits

Federal ConSt:i±uions permit the state to use because of

the section that follows

~ein.

§41-6-44.10 (h) reads as follows:

If a person umer arrest refuses to subnit to a
cha'!lical test or tests umer the provisions of the section,
evidence of a refusal shall be admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged
to have been ccmnitted while the peroon was driving or
in the actual physical control of a ITOtor vehicle while umer
the influence of alcohol or any drug or caninbation of
alcoool and any drug.
As

a result of subsection (h), a person charged with a cr:ine is in fact

canpelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal proceeding
no natter which croice he makes.

The refusal h:sring then beccmas only

a step in providin;J criminal evidence.

(There

is ro legal carpulsion to

dismiss the criminal charges if the defen:iant is fo..md to not have
refused the chanical test).
Utah has recognized that pursuant to the section of the law at
issue herein, an accused has a "right" to refuse the ohanical test.
he

If

does, and does so unreaoonably, then he nust suffer the consequences.

Peterson v. I:orius, 547 P. 2d 693, Hunt:er v. I:orius, 23 U. 2d 122, 458
P. 2d 877 I !-bran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d 241 (ut. 1978).

But umer subsection

(h) the cooice becomes rreaningless with:>ut the reasoned judgment of counsel
to determine
which Law
alternative
protects
theprovided
suspect
ITOst
effectively.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
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In denying a right to counsel in refusal hearing circumstances,

sare states have specifically in::licated that the result of such beari.n:js,
expressly were not admissiable in the perrling criminal proceedings, they
based their decisions, at least partly, on that dichotany.

Deaner v.

Carrronwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E. 2d 199 (Va., 1969), State v. Dellveneri
128 vt. 85, 258 A. 2d 834 (Vt., 1969), Stratikos v. Oregon

De~t

of M::ltor Vehicles, 4 Ore. App. 313, 477 P. 2d 237 (Ore., 1970).
Other courts have used the fact that their l.aws, like utah's,

provide that said refusals are admissilile in criminal procedures.
State v. Welch, 376 A. 2d 351 (Vt., 1977); Siegwald v.

eurry,

319 N.E.

2d 381 (Ohio, 1974) they exterrled the right to counsel in these cases.
In Utah, prior to the 1977 amendloonts which ad:led subsections

(g) arD. (h), the court has recognized the acceptability of access to an
attorney in reaching the decision to sul:mit to or refuse a chemical test.
The court has not couched discussions of access to counsel in terms
of constitutional rights, .tut rather in tenns of reasonableness of a
request to consult counsel.

Peterson v. J:brius, supra.; Hunter v. D:>rius,

supra.; ~ran v. Shaw, supra..

In each case cited, an opportwrity was giv5

to the accused to call an attorney
a refusal report.

am. subsequnetly a delay resultai

in

The Appellant has not found a case in Utah where the

Court discussed the right to counsel in these cirCll!llStances and un:ler the

1977 ame00ments which added subsections (g) arD. (h) .

Rather, the

right to refuse was the basis for the privilege.
Various courts have exterrled access to counsel to involve situatilll
where an administrative refusal hearing was the result of the police
activity.

In Ohio, the court has said that there is a constitutional

right to consult counsel, wt that right rray be_controlled by time
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arrl circumstance.

That is, there is a rrodified right.

There, the court

has exterrled a statute providing a right to counsel in criminal cases
to ioclude refusal situations.

Siegwald v. curry, supra..

The

court there stated at p. 384:
Alt.OOugh the proceerli.ngs relative to the suspension
of driving rights, for a failure to take a chanical test,
and a prosecution for driving while under the influence are
separate and distinct procedings, the fonrer being civil
and the latter criminal, it is difficult to distinguish
between the t\\U proceedi.ngs up until there is a refusal to
take a chanical test.
Consequently, the court there saw fit to extend the statutory right
to counsel to include refusal situations.

~

court expressly emphasized

the fact that there, as in Utah, the refusal could be used to support

a criminal conviction.

Id.

at p. 385.

See

also:

Troy v. curry,

303 N.E. 2d 925 (Ohio, 1975).
In

the case of People v. Gursey, 22 N.W. 2d 224,

29~

N.Y.S. 416,

239 N.Y. 2d 351 (N.Y. Ct. of App., 1968), a criminal case, the court

exten:led a rrodified right to consult counsel.

There, as in our case,

the accused knew the lawyer he wanted to call and was refused until
after he took a chemical test.

The

court stated as follows:

"By these provision, defendant had the option to
refuse to take the drunkeness test, electing instead to
subnit to the revocation of his license. • • • Of course,
defendant was informed that he w:mld lose his license if
he refused to take the police administered test.Nevertheless,
he wished legal counseli.Ilg concerning his option and refused
to subnit to the test until his several requests to
telephone his lawyer were denied. Granting defendant's
request would not have substantially interferred with the
investigative procedure, since the telephone call ~uld have
been concluded in a matter of minutes. At least,
the record here does not indicate otherwise. Consequently,
the denial of defendant's requests for an opportunity to telepmne
his lawyer nust be deaned to have violated his privilege of
his access to counsel. 239 N.E. 2d at p. 353.
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The holding there was the same as that in an autarobile h:::Inicide case
which involve:l an :inpliErl consent statute in the State of Verrront.
State v. Welch, supra..

That court statErl:

In view of the statutory provision of 23 VSA §1205 (a)
protecting an operator's right to refuse to take any test, it
seans clear that when a seria.is criminal case is involva:l,
the request to sul:mit to a chanical test can rise
to the level of a "critical stage" in the proceErlings. Tre
choice whether to take the test will invariably affect
the evidence that will be nade available at trial, arrl the
presurcptions to be drawn fran that evidence. The Implied Consent
law, therefore, by creating the statutory choice,
has put the suspect operator in a situation where counsel
could be of aid. It seans to us, then, that concern for the
individual's rights requires that -we recognize a
limitErl right to counsel so that drivers may adequately
evaluate their decision pursuant to the InpliErl Cbnsent law.
Id. at p. 355.

The court made the request to take a chanical test arrl the choices
therefran a "critical stag<:!" of the proceErlings.
it to a level requiring right to coJ.nsel.
18 L. Fd. 2nd ll49, 875 ct. 1926 (1967).

Thereby they bring

U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 281,
Also, because of the "right

to refuse" the "critical stage" attaches as distinguistm from the facts
of Schmerber v. california, 384

u.s.

757, 16 L. Fd. 2d 908, 86

s.ct.

1826 (1966) where there was no "right to refuse" arrl no suggestion that
a refusal would be used against the defendant.
In each instance citErl in the Siegwald, Gursey and Welch cases

they grantErl a limitErl right to consult counsel. In each instance
they ~e sensitive to the neErls of the IDl.ice for a rapid canpletion of
their procedures.
In People v. Gursey, supra. at p. 352, the court stated its

limitations:

"The privilege of consulting with cnmsel concernin9'
the exercise of legal rights to counsel J:xJwever, exterrl
so far as to palpably :inpair or nulify the statutory proc~e
requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losl.!19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Librarytheir
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and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Arrl in State v. Welch, supra. at p. 355, the court limited its ruling:

Therefore, the Court holds that police officials
may not, without reason, deny access between an accused
and his lawyer, when ruch access is requested and is
ieaaily available and will not interfere with investigation
of the matter at hand.
While the Welch case and the

~

case lx>th involved the

criminal case underlying the :intJlied consent law, there is little to
be

acc:orplisherl by applying a different standard to refusal hearings

where the results may be used in criminal prosecutions.

Furtherrrore,

in Siegwald v. CUrry, supra. , the Ohio coort expressly avoided such

a dichotomy.

Corparing the Gursey case in

New

Yark with a case decided

earlier, they avoided an unnecessary conflict.
The apparent New York result fran these cases is that
where a person, required to sul:mit to a chanical test pursuant
to the :intJlied consent law, refuses to do so until he telepnmes
his attorney, such person's driving rights are revoked even
though the right to telephone the attorney is denied by
the police. However, if, instead of refusing to sul:mit to the
test when denied the right to telephone his attorney, he sul:mits
to the test, the results of the test are not admissable into
evidence against rum. We cannot agree that such is, or should
be the law of Ohio. such a rule \\Ould encourage persons
arrested for driving while intoxicated to inmediately request
the right to call an attorney, and, when denied the
right to do so by the police, as the cases i.00.icate appears to
be the custan, to sul::mit to the test,and have the results
thereof suppressed upon trial, thereby substantially lessening
the chances of conviction. 319 N.E. 2d at p. 387.
In

Utah, Article, Section 11 of The Constitution of the State of

Utah guarantees the right to counsel in civil cases.

Denying access to

counsel under the provision of §41-6-44.10 (g) effectually bars a person
fran effective counsel and the rationale of Kirby v. Illinois, supra.,
arrl Escobedo v. Illinois, supra., is particularly appropriate.

It is a clear denial of an essential right, the right to counsel,
tc require a person under the circumstances of our case, where whatever

choice he rrakes will result in evidence in a criminal hearing, to be denied
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lnasiui:r

at least telepronic access to a lawyer before making that cmice.

as he does in fact have a right to make such a ch:>ice, it \olOUld be a
rrean:j;ngless right i f he had no understan::'iing as to what the potential
harm fran a particular choice 'WOUld be.

For instance I i f he wishe:l oot

m

provide evidence of intoxication to the court in a drunk driving cirCl.l!Mt.am
an:i \\U\lld rather face the civil interruption of his privilege to drive

on the highways of the State of Utah, he may mistakenly think
evidence fran a criminal prosecution by refusing.

re

is keepiro

When in fact, he lll:iy

very well be giving \llOrse evidence against himself an:i causing greater
restrictions on his potential freedan than he \olOUld i f he consulterl counsel
to determine the full ircpact of his de:::ision.

Furthernore, there are few

attorneys aware of the provisions of §41-6-44.10 U.C.A. wtx:> would recamen
that a suspect refuse to take a chemical test unless it was distinctly
a strategic rrove to protect the suspe:::t' s rights in a criminal proceeiings,
or, i f based upon what the suspe:::t says, there is no reason for which the
police shoo.Id ask the suspect to take such a test in the first place.
'lllerefore, there \<>lQ.lld be no damage done to the intent of the
legislature nor the efficiency of the police in keeping intoxicaterl
drivers off the streets in Utah.

The right to consult counsel can

be limited to a situation where, by allCMing a telep00ne call, no undue
or unreasonable delay will happen.

Because of the rapid dissipatior. of

the level of alcol'x:>l in the blood, an:i the statutory one hour requirerents,

§41-6-44. 5

u.c.A.,

to the jail.

there would seldan be time for the attorney to cane

Also, if the attorney cannot be reached readily by teleph:llle,

the b.Jrden is on the accused.

By such a system, the right of the accuse:l

are prote:::ted as far as efficacy allows an:i the needs of society are not
prejudiced.
In our case, it is clear that the Appellant had about ten minutes
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to call an attorney wlx:>se teleph:ine number he knew by merory an:'! that he
kneW was h:rre.

Had he so called, this case would never have gotten

to this court and the adversary process could have taken a nonral course.

The vitality of a person being able to defend against charges
of driving under the influence danand that he be granted a right to telephone

his attorney.

In rrost instances, with a five minute teleprone conversation,

the accused can determine whether his criminal risk is such that he srould
take a chemical test, tlnls avoiding a civil determination of refusal,
and the use of such determination against him or to provide evidence of

a refusal to the criminal arsenal of the state.

Inasmuch as there

is no possibility of a restricted license in refusal situations, rrost
of the tine the recamendation will be to take the test.

Where there

are circumstances in which it would be protective of the defendant to
refuse, he sOOuld make that decision with the benefit of counsel.

That

choice can rrean the difference between jail and freedan, and should
not be restricted beyOirl necessity.

Where both choices result in criminal

evidence, an attorney's experience an:'! judgirent are necessary to fully
protect an accused.

Anything srort of this limited right to consult

counsel effectively denies to an accused an attorney at the rrost critical
stage of the proceedings, U.S. v. Wade, supra ..
II
lliE REFUSAL MUST BE 'ONBJUIVOCAL IN ORDER TO BE REASCNABLE AND,
UNDER THE FACI'S OF THIS CASE, 'lHE !IDJUEST TO CXNI'ACI' COUNSEL SimED
A SINCERE DESIRE TO MEET THE TEIM:> OF THE I»l AND IDI' TO UNE()UIVOCABLY
REFl.JSE TO SUBMIT TO A ClfilfiCAL TF.sT.

At all times, the Appellant herein was willing to follCM the
advice of counsel.

He had been infonned of a right to oounsel under the

Miranda warning and, as he testified, he ~not subsequently infonned
he hadby no
such
right.
He was
given
a card to
readby on
the :i.nplied
consent
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statute that did not negate his right to counsel (T-68) .

Urrler tlose

circumstances he v.as entitied to believe he had a right to counsel.

F\lrtherrrore, he felt he had been umuly delayed in getting to the jail
and wanted to telephone counsel that he knew was lune and wtose telepmne

number he knew.
'!'he entire problan involved in this case 'WOUld have been avciderl

had the officer granted him a pmne call and limited it to three minutes
or five minutes.

The State of the accuse:i \\OUld have had the evidence

desired and the matter "Y.Uuld have proceeded as the law is designerl to
provide for.
The general application of this type of law has been that the

refusal sh:>uld be une'.Jl,livocal.

Gassman v. Ik>rius, 543 P. 2d. 197 (UtahJ 1

Hunter v. I:Orius, supra.; Peters:m2.
523

s.w.

2d 861 (M:>., 1975).

I:Ori~,

I t is clear

there was no unequivocal refusal.

supra.; Gooch v. Spradling 1

fran the facts of this case, thlt

The Appellant s:inply wanted an opporturut

to contact counsel, at which ti.m:! he 'Y.Uuld have fourrl he had no right to
have counsel present or 'WO\lld have lost his defense that could derive frm
a chemical test.

That was a reasonable expectation.

Furtherrrvre, sare states have found that

~re

Miranda rights

are given, the fact that there is no right to counsel umer the .implie'.l
consent law (a state of the law Appellant does not concede), IlUlSt be
clearly explained.

Calvert v. State Department of Revenue, .r-t>tor Vehick

Division, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo., 1974); Plumb v. Department of .r-t>tor Vehi~
1 Cal. App. 3rd 256, 81 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1969); State v. Severino, 537 p,

1187 (Hawaii, 1975);

swan

2ri

v. Depa.rbtent of Public Safety, 311 Southern

2d 493 (Ia. App. 1975) , State Department of Highways vs. lee, 292 Minn· 4JJ,
194 N.W. 2d 766 (1972).
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Since the Appellant was sincerely attarpting to fulfill a right
he tOOu.ght he had (T-67, T-68)

am

was not informed that he did not,

he was justified. in insisting in a right to consult counsel.

telepoone call could have dispelled any wrongful inpression

A sinple

am

irost likely

avoided the subsequent c:arplications.
This Court has stated that this section of the Utah Code Armotated
:irrplicitly is "subject to a fair and sensible application urder reasonable
corrlitions".

M::)ran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d at p. 243.

The request of the

Appellant here could have been fulfilled in full spirit of the law without
affe:::ting the practicality of :he requested c:tanical test nor causing
unreasonable delay.

While his YJOrds in1icated a desire to have counsel

present, a telephone call YJOuld have necessarily preceded that request.
Had the lawyer not been contaced or, if contacted, given faulty advice,
the Appellant YJOuld have had to live with those circumstances.

:&it,

if the attorney had been reached, in all likeli.hocxl the Appellant YJOuld have

taken the chemical test :imned.iately.

In

any event, he

\'IOuld

have receivai

all he could ask for an:i the State YJOuld have excluded the defense
Appellant has been forced to use here.
a::NCLUSION
The provisions of §41-6-44.10 (g) Utah Code Armotated (as ~ed)

denying a right to consult counsel in detennining whether or not to

exercise one's right to refuse to sulJnit to a chemical test of intoxication,
when read in the light of §41-6-44.10 (h), is uoconstitutional urder

l:oth the Federal and State Constitutions.
make betYieen

tYJO

There is a critical decision to

choices, either of which will result in eviden::e for a

cr:im:inaJ. prosecution.

It is critical that an accused have at least

telepronic access to an attorney, if such access does not unreasonably
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interfere with the timliness of the proposed .i.mrestigation.

'lb all™

otherwise will destroy any cxmcept of fairness in the law and rrost
likely will result in rrore refusals than if oounsel were consulted.

rn

the facts of this case, a fair and reasonable interpretation cal

for the conclusion that the Appellant's request for cc:runsel was not,
under the circumstances, unreasonable, nor did he intend to cira.nnvent
the requinnents of the law.

He s.imply sought to exercise his rights

urr1er the Miranda ruling, of \obich h:! had been advised, to see that his
choices "Were ex:ercised within legal ba.ux:iaries.
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HAND DEL!VE!{Y CEXl'lFICATE

I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was ham
deliverErl to Ibbert B. Hansen arrl Bruce Hale at the Attorney General's
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt lake City, utah 84114, on this

- - - - -day

of October, 1978.
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